

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE NATIONAL INTEREST

#### The Concept of National Interest

National interest is not only the key concept in foreign policy but also is a guide to the foreign policy formulation. The history of the concept of national interest dates back to the time when the evolution of the modern state system took place.<sup>1</sup> It was and remains an important element to describe the underlying rationale for the behaviour of states and statesmen in a threatening international environment. But the idea of separateness, of differentness from others, and the consequent idea of preserving and protecting one's values against others, goes back to antiquity. The word "interest" derives from the Latin, meaning "it concerns, it makes a difference to, it is important with reference to some person or thing."<sup>2</sup>

One common-sense definition describes it as the general and continuing ends for which the nation acts.<sup>3</sup> National interest shows the aspirations of the state, it can be used also operationally, in application to the actual policies and programmes pursued; it can be used polemically in political argument, to explain, rationalise or criticise. Above all, all statesmen are governed by their respective national interest.<sup>4</sup> Whenever a treaty or summit takes place, the statesmen keep

---

<sup>1</sup> Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1934), p. 20; see also James N. Rosenau, "National Interest", in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 33-39.

<sup>2</sup> Beard, *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World* (Oxford, 1979), p. 85.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

their national interest hung round the neck. If a statesman agrees to concessions or preferential treatment, he does so only when he is convinced that this brings some advantage to his state directly or indirectly. For instance, America's approval of China as a Most Favoured Nation signifies America's interest to catch the potential market. So this favourable treatment of China, secured not only trade openings but also friendship. When China was admitted in the United Nations through United States endeavour, it showed a greater political cum economical interest. Co-operation, conflict, war, competition, rapprochement and all take place keeping in mind the interest of the nation at a given situation.

The crux of the concept as advanced in the post-war years, was that in a world in which states are "the major units of political life, which command the supreme loyalty and affection of great mass of individuals."<sup>5</sup> Statesmen who are responsible for and to their separate publics, and who operate in an uncertain and threatening milieu, have little choice but to put the interests of their own entity above those of others or those of the international system. National interest, thus became a synonym for national egoism. One could not rely on others, nor could one rely on international institutions and processes to protect one's key values. See what happened in the inter-war period, despite international institutions, such as- international law, international organisation and international trade, had been set up to reduce the harshness of "realpolitik", but had culminated in a disastrous World War II. International institutions are invariably controlled by powerful countries. Even these international institutions are acted upon to meet the national

---

<sup>5</sup> Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, 1953), p.10.

interest of those powerful and influential countries. The values and interests of a country is national in scope and the protection is necessary which can be done only by that country. Osgood put it as follows:

National interests is understood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism, which leads men to seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national group.<sup>6</sup>

Robert Osgood was absolutely correct in placing the national survival or self-preservation at the head of the list, because everything else would clearly depend on the achievement of this goal. He defined survival or self-preservation in terms of territorial integrity, political independence, and maintenance of fundamental governmental institutions.<sup>7</sup> Osgood categorises other important national interest too, they are, self-sufficiency, prestige, aggrandisement.<sup>8</sup>

Charles Beard was of the opinion that territory and commerce are fundamental aspects of national interest.<sup>9</sup>

Morganthau defined national interest as "the survival of a political unit..... in its identity" as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest *vis-à-vis* other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's territory, its political institutions, and its culture.<sup>10</sup>

What the nation is concern about?. The prime concern of the nation may be security of the nation and its people and protecting the values and cultures. It is

---

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, pp. 5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Beard, n. 1, p. 26.

<sup>10</sup> Hans J. Morganthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Review* (Washington), December 1952, p. 973.

often believed that there is an irreducible core of national interest for any state at any given time. This called the vital interest of a nation. The vital interest is that it is that on which, if necessary, it is prepared to go to war. In other words, the vital interest is one which is so important for state that it is normally willing to go to war immediately or ultimately in order to safeguard that interest. The vital interest of a country is supposed to be so basic that it is often regarded as permanent. Hence, it is also supposed to be primary to which all other aspects of the national interest remain subordinated. The vital character of national interest invariably has an emotional appeal to the people. Such vital interests include for all states, as a minimum, the protection and preservation of their independence and territorial integrity.

The vital aspect of national interest changes under the impact of various factors. Sometimes, a change in the values of the leadership or people brings about a change in the concept of the vital national interest. Sometimes an interest, which may not have any intrinsic importance, may become vital if it assumes symbolic value or if it involves the question of national prestige. For example, Soviet Union intervention in Yugoslavia, was regarded by the Soviet Union as necessary for the protection of its vital interest. The US intervention in Vietnam was regarded by the United States as necessary for the protection of its vital interests. Since the Second World War, the economic, psychological, and ideological aspect had been gaining in importance as far as the character of vital national interest.

### **Proletarian Internationalism and National Interests**

The nature and the closeness of relations are determined by national

interests and by perceptions of common threat. The relations among countries ruled by communist parties were completely different from that of democratic societies. National interests were superseded by imperatives of ideological unity, both against the perceived common enemy, "imperialism," and as reinsurance against attempts to dislodge communist leadership from within. Although day-by-day affairs of state were conducted on a government-to-government level, but actually all major policy decisions were made by party leaders who maintained continuous liaison through separate party channels. It was through these channels that communist states co-ordinate their common foreign policy positions, their trade policies, and even their educational systems, which stress communist values based on Marxist-Leninist teachings. Even when a party-controlled press would view the national and international events, there were rarely actual contradictions with interpretations of similar events in other communist countries.

Theoretical foundations for communist unity had been developed in the Soviet Union long before other socialist states came into being at the end of the Second World War. The Primacy of the Soviet Union, as the only power able to withstand the pressures emanating from the hostile "imperialist" environment, was recognised by all communist parties, whose sacred duty was to protect and advance Soviet interests, assumed to be in the interest of all, a *sine qua non* for survival and success of the communist cause. This assumption had been the very core of Soviet foreign policy, if not always shared to the same extent by leaders of other socialist states.

Since the World War II, the world was polarised into two camps: socialist,

comprising those ruled by communist parties, and non-socialist, which encompassed the rest. The prominent characteristic of the socialist was that they had all undergone a socialist revolution in which the old capitalist ruling classes lost power to communists, who then transformed their respective societies politically and economically accordingly to Marxists-Leninist principles. Having formed a “socialist camp” by the mid-1950s, these states in their foreign policies had one common interest: they opposed “imperialism” and favour national liberation movements struggling against it. Ideally, in Soviet theory-and for a while in actual practice- it was the Central Committee of the CPSU that was called upon to provide members of the socialist camp, as they conducted their relations with the outside world, with general guidelines and day-by-day co-ordination.

The doctrine of proletarian internationalism, whose principles and patterns of action were formed in the Comintern period.<sup>11</sup> It was founded on the common interest in the struggle against imperialism existed within the revolutionary workers’ movement. Proletarian internationalism was an indivisible concept drawn from common values rooted in Marxism-Leninism. Proletarian internationalism was in fact identical with the process leading to the removal of national contradictions. And anything that hinders and checks the elimination of such contradictions is an expression of and element of nationalism. In order to be in line with proletarian internationalisation, nation should outgrow national narrow-mindedness, isolation and exclusiveness. Internationalism is nothing but shedding

---

<sup>11</sup> Heinz Timmermann, *The Decline of the World Communist Movement* (Boulder and London, 1987), p. 2.

of national narrow-mindedness. Nationalism means insistence on the national element, and internationalism-inversely- rising above the national element. Therefore, “proletarian nationalist” must free himself of “national narrowness” and must distinguish himself by his concern for “wider”, “common” interests of humanity and social progress.<sup>12</sup>

The Soviet Union became the symbol of all hope for a revolutionary future, and the defence of the Soviet land became the duty of every Communist. The member parties of the Comintern copied the Soviet model in all details- ideologically, politically, organisationally, following the “bolshevisation” decreed by Stalin. Upholding the Soviet foreign policy and national interest became an unquestioned duty by all communist parties. Communist were ruled by Stalin’s maxim of 1927:

He is a revolutionary, who without reservations, unconditionally, openly and honestly.... is ready to protect and defend the USSR is the first revolutionary proletarian state in the world, which is building socialism. He is an internationalist, who without reservations, without wavering, without making conditions, is ready to protect the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the revolutionary movement in the whole world.<sup>13</sup>

Loyalty to the Soviet Union was the touchstone for the loyalty to proletarian internationalism. Under Stalin, the CPSU succeeded in passing off the idea that the national interests of Soviet Union was good to the health of the world communism. CPSU demanded that every communist party should place the

---

<sup>12</sup> Kiro Hadzi Vasilev, “Internationalism and the Unity of Socialist Forces, *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Beograd), no. 4, December 1961, p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> Josef Stalin, *Selected Works* (East Berlin, 1952), vol. 10, p. 45.

interests of the entire movement above its own particular interests. Thus Soviet interests were given priority and made any criticism impossible. All criticism was outlawed and suffocated, every change of the CPSU line had to be followed without reservation.

Until the cleavage set in the communist movement, the communist parties supported Soviet interests with the tacit assumption that they were not serving the interests of an ordinary state, but rather the bulwark of the revolution, encircled by imperialism and threatened in its existence. Defence of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp thus served their own interests as revolutionary parties, since the USSR represented both a base for future revolutions and at the same time a symbol that they too had chance to defeat the bourgeoisie with their own force.

The hold over the communist parties changed when the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress abandoned the thesis of capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union in favour of the idea that world capitalism had entered into a new third stage in its general crisis, while the international socialist camp was exerting an ever greater influence on events in the world. Khrushchev who not only repudiated Stalin's emasculation of the communist parties, he also propounded that in an international class struggle characterised by peaceful co-existence, each party would contribute by its own strategy to shifting the world balance of power toward socialism.<sup>14</sup> The 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress was based on the conviction that "there can be no serious conflict between the interests of Soviet power and the interests of world revolutionary

---

<sup>14</sup> Timmermann, n. 11, p. 37.



expansion by independent communist states and movements.”<sup>15</sup> Khrushchev believed in principle in the concordance of interests of all communist parties, in power or not.

But Khrushchev’s conception of new line proved to be unrealistic. The proofs came in the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, the second break with the League of Yugoslav communist in 1957, the conflict with the Chinese communists which broke into the open in 1960, and finally the divergences with the Italian party. The Stalin-Tito rift in 1948 had already made it clear that a common Marxist-Leninist ideology was not suited to bridging over differences about the national conditions and interests of the individual parties. On the contrary, when used as an instrument to legitimise special roads to communism, a variously interpreted ideology rekindled smouldering conflicts of interests, most fiercely in the argument between Moscow and Beijing. China felt that Soviet Union was willing to sacrifice the interests of other communist parties to the expediencies of Soviet interests. communist parties believed that their party line served Soviet interests, was an important source of disaffection.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, the proletarian internationalism was unable to suppress national feelings whatsoever. The conflicts were ascribed to rise of Chinese nationalism. Slowly, national interest of China predominated in their policies against Soviet Union. And national identity was the core of the individual in China. And in carrying the revolution beyond the bourgeois phase, Maoism was actuated not

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Communism and China* (Bombay, 1968), p. 36.

merely by ideological commitments but also by a vital national interest. It was determined to turn China into an integrated and modern nation. This was the seed of resistance to communism to grow.<sup>17</sup>

And the differences started growing by leaps and bounds in all possible way and the old rifts of national expansion had come more emphatic and complicated. Both regimes were no longer interested in their relationship (especially after the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of the CPSU), but were striving to dominate each other and the world. As result, they had conflicting national interests emerging out of common interests. Marx and Lenin did not foresee that communist countries would succumb to the bacillus of nationalism, and that this germ shattered the unity of the world communist movement. Of course, nationalism was taking precedence over international communism from then on.

An identical view was expressed by President Nixon in his foreign policy message that the international communist unity had been shattered the unified bloc solidarity had been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. Thus the Marxist dream of international communist unity had disintegrated.

The Lenin centenary theses of the CPSU's CC put the same idea in another way proclaiming that neither nationalism in any of its forms nor national nihilism were compatible with socialism.

“Marxists doctrine became a camouflage which more or less concealed nationalist and imperialist aims,” said the Russian opposition writer and historian

---

<sup>17</sup> Ernst Kux, 'Revolution in Eastern Europe - Revolution in the West?', vol. 40, *Problems of Communism* (Washington), May-June, 1991, p. 10; and Issac Deutscher, *Ironies of History*, (London, 1966), p.108.

Andrey Amalrik reflected in his famous essay on the possibility of war between Russia and China coming in respect to the conflict to the following conclusion:

The absolute antagonism of their national-imperial interests and the conflicting character of the internal processes in each country- 'proletarianisation' and the rise of a fearsome 'revolutionary curve' in China and 'deproletarianisation' and a cautious descent along the same curve in the Soviet Union-quickly put an end to any pretence of unity.<sup>18</sup>

This is the clear sign of an erosion of communist solidarity because of national self-interest. The Soviet-Chinese schism was playing a paramount role in the process. The same socio-economic system could not save communist countries from disagreement and contradiction as was once held. The ruling Parties were no longer simply national branches of the communist international. It was very difficult to conceal the national consciousness and national pride in the socialist internationalism. The international communist conferences of 1957 and 1960 tried vainly to surmount the vestiges of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism.

Each nation has its own national interest connected with peculiarities of its history, geographical location, economic development, etc. ... In the same way, every socialist state may have its own national interest pertinent to its history, geographical location, economic development, etc. ... An underestimation of national interests and requirements and a striving to accomplish internationalist tasks without regard for the specific nature of their refraction through the prism of the national consciousness of socialist peoples can harm the cause of unity of the fraternal countries.

---

<sup>18</sup> Andrey A. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York, 1970), pp. 45 and 49; see also *The New York Times*, February 19, 1970.

Mutual accusation took priority during their conflictual period. The Chinese described the Soviet leadership as sunk in the mire of bourgeois national egoism. The Soviets accused the ideological-political platform of the Mao Tse-tung as nationalistic big-power policy.

Dean Rusk said, in his statement outlining ten elements in American policy toward communist China, before a closed session of the Sub-Committee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee:

The essential nature of this conflict...has, if anything, intensified and widened. Its Russo-Chinese national aspects have become more conspicuous.<sup>19</sup>

Roger Hilsman, Department of Law and Government, Columbia University, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, declared at the hearings held by the same Sub-Committee the previous year:

My feeling is that the Chinese communist price for healing the breach will be too high for the Soviets to pay. In the first place, the Chinese will undoubtedly insist on a very large share of the leadership of the bloc and a very large place for Chinese national interests, as opposed to Russian national interests, in deciding on bloc policy-in both cases probably too large a share.<sup>20</sup>

Edwin O. Reischauer, a renowned Orientalist and former U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, said in his book:

The Chinese had a deep national pride and long and bitter resentments of the Occident that made the acceptance of Russian domination extremely distasteful to them. Two such huge and different nations, even though joined by the same communist faith, did not necessarily have mutually compatible national interests.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> *The New York Times*, April 17, 1966.

<sup>20</sup> *Sino-Soviet Conflict Report and Hearings: Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1965)*, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia* (New York, 1967), p. 62.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian head of state, said in an address to a young socialist rally that there was a white communism and yellow communism, and they would collide when their nationalist interest diverge.<sup>22</sup>

Walter Lippmann wrote:

I am convinced it is the same conflict which existed when the Emperor of all the Russians and the Emperor of China were still on their thrones. It is a conflict of national interests between the Russians and the Chinese which has gone on for generations, and it is due to a collision between the Russians expanding across Siberia to the Manchuria and Mongolia, across the path of the Russians.<sup>23</sup>

Edgar Snow said in his book, after interviewing Chinese communist leaders and touring two-thirds of the provinces of China proper:

What recent years have revealed is that nationalism inside the communist system of states threatens to be at least as powerful a factor as the bonds of class solidarity which socialist power would theoretically make unbreakable.<sup>24</sup>

The true nature of the conflict was confirmed by Tito that the differences were less ideological and more political in character.<sup>25</sup>

However, Soviet Union and Communist China were nation-states in the broadest sense, each with a strong sense of self-identity, or that they were states which thought in terms of national interest. One can hardly deny the presence of nationalism in both states. The nationalism of the Communist Chinese leadership was indeed virulent in intensity and its beginning could already be clearly discerned in the Yen-an period. The relations between Soviet Union and China,

---

<sup>22</sup> *U.S. News and World Report*, June 22, 1970.

<sup>23</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, April 9, 1962.

<sup>24</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red China Today: The Other Side of the River*, (London, 1970), p. 101.

<sup>25</sup> *The New York Mirror*, August 14, 1962, p. 18.

whole period after the final showdown in the Ussuri river could be adequately described wholly in terms of national interest calculus. Soviet-Chinese national interest is seen in through the prism of identical interests (common interests), complementary interests and conflicting interests during different periods of regime.

### **Identical Interest or Common interest**

Identical interests between nations obviously are those national interests which those nations hold in common.<sup>26</sup>The degree to which common interests exist between two nations depends upon the nature of general international relations and the particular policies of the states in question at a particular point of time. The range of common interest between Soviet Union and China in 1949-1956 was certainly greater than in the following periods. Equally the common interest between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1944 was certainly greater than what it was in 1953. Thus, the identical interest or common interest is not always static. For a proper understanding of the common interests of states, it should be borne in mind that the area of commonness is always subject to change. Therefore, it should never be presumed that any existing state of affairs would continue in future or for any definite period of time. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1950 between Soviet Union and China did not last long, albeit their ideological affinity. The Russo-German Pact signed in 1939 lasted only up to June 1941 when Hitler invaded Russia. This is so because that nations tend towards keeping their

---

<sup>26</sup> Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice", in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in The Cold War* (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 188- 191; Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defence of the National Interest*, (Chicago, 1950), p. 146.

agreements only as long as their doing so is considered helpful in the furtherance of their national interest. The reason why the area of common interests undergoes change is the fact that relations of states are neither simple nor static. It is almost impossible to find out a case of two nations whose interests are completely incompatible or identical. At any given time, two states are likely to have a number of opposed as well as common interests.

### **Complementary Interest**

Complementary interests between nations are those which, although not identical, at least are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues.<sup>27</sup> Soviet Union was against United States influence in Europe and China was against United States influence in Taiwan. Equally, England had an interest in maintaining the independence of Portugal from Spain as a means of controlling the regions of the Atlantic Ocean off the Iberian peninsula, while Portugal had an interest in British maritime hegemony as a means of defence against Spain.

### **Conflicting Interest**

Conflicting interests are those national interests of a country against one or more countries. In the initial period, the relationship between Soviet Union and China was one of more amicable and their national interests were one of more identical and complementary than conflicting one. But in the second half of 1950s, their conflicting interests started overpowering the identical or common interests. It should be noted, however, that today's conflicting interests can be transformed tomorrow, through diplomacy, occurrence of events, or the passage of time into

---

<sup>27</sup>Ibid, p.146; and *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1962), p. 173.

common or complementary interests.<sup>28</sup> The same thing might be said about the possibility of transforming identical or complementary interests into conflicting interests. Of course, with the passage of time the number of common and opposed interests of each nation grows or declines, depending on what the current exigencies of international relations demand.

Of course, the term 'national interest' is a very vague term<sup>29</sup>. Nonetheless, the term 'national interest' is of great significance to the international relations. National interest is also defined as that which states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other.<sup>30</sup> It covers desires on the part of sovereign state and these desires vary enormously from state to state and from time to time. And more so ever, it is interesting to find out how national interest played its part in the Soviet-Chinese relations. Co-operation, conflict and rapprochement played a greater role in Soviet-Chinese relations keeping in mind the national interests.

### **Soviet-Chinese National Interests During Stalin Era**

After the death of Lenin in 1924 and Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the CCP and the KMT began to go their separate ways. At the same time, the policy differences began to develop between the CCP and Stalin. For Stalin, the CCP was but a pawn to be used to keep China weak, divided, and out of the control of other great powers (e.g., Britain in the 1920s, Japan in the 1930s, and the United States in the 1940s). To achieve this goal, Stalin had deeply involved himself in Chinese

---

<sup>28</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago, 1964), p. 198, 203.

<sup>29</sup> Raymond Aron, trs., Richard Howard and Anneite Baker Fox, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York, 1967), p. 89; see also Rosenau, n. 1, p. 34.

<sup>30</sup> See Veron Van Dyke, *International Politics* (New York, 1957).



domestic politics from the 1920s onwards keeping in mind the Soviet national interests which were vital for the security of the newly born communist nation.<sup>31</sup>

During the 1920s, Stalin played with three sides in China. He recognised the official government in Beijing, but rendered assistance to its challenger, Chiang Kai-shek.

Meanwhile, he fostered the growth of the CCP against KMT leadership. As for the strategy of Communist revolution in China, Stalin tried to apply Marxist doctrine. He assigned the leading role to the urban workers, which led to disastrous consequences for the CCP. During second half of 1930s, Stalin was wrapped up with the threat of Nazi Germany. His main goal in Asia was to direct Japan's expansionist drive toward China and away from Siberia. His China policy underscored to the Chinese communists that he would readily undermine their interests in order to promote Soviet national interests. Thus, the Xian Incident of December 1936 was solved in a way to unite China against Japan, and a neutrality treaty was signed between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1941. These moves saved Siberia from Japan, In the mean time, Xinjiang, under the leadership of Sheng Shicai, almost became Russia's New Frontier.

After the Second World War, Stalin imposed communism in the Eastern European countries one after the another. But in the case of China, he was interested in acquiring monopoly of power rather than promoting communist

---

<sup>31</sup> For Stalin's China Policy, see Conard Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (Cambridge, MA, 1958); see also Stephen Unalloy, Jr., *A History of the Chinese Communist Party* (Stanford, 1988).

revolution. For instance, in Xinjiang he helped to establish the so-called Eastern Turkestan Republic. By early 1949, when armed revolt appeared hopeless, he demanded that the Nationalist government cede the mining rights in Xinjiang for fifty years. Finally, when the communist troops were approaching Xinjiang, the Soviet consul in Urumchi suggested to a Nationalist general that he declare Xinjiang independent on the model of Outer Mongolia and said, "if you will do this, we will order the Chinese Communists not to continue their advance into Xinjiang."<sup>32</sup> Basically, Stalin preferred weak China against a strong China so that it was dependent on Soviet Union. At the same time he was for giving China as little aid as possible to keep her under control and satisfied. Not only that, but also it would give Stalin a greater and more spacious room to intervene in the internal matters of CCP to decide the political course of China. However, Mao was quick to shirk Moscow's control. Thus, he abandoned Moscow's preferred urban approach to revolution and sought, instead, to develop a revolutionary base in the expansive and backward countryside.

Notwithstanding the conflictual interests in their early relations, they both did have identical interests, especially aftermath of the World War II. When Chinese Communists took power in October 1, 1949, the concept of nonalignment was in its infancy, and neutrality was a luxury word for small states on the geostrategic periphery. China's size and location made it the focus of superpower competition, while its need for economic reconstruction compelled it to seek

---

<sup>32</sup> Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-tsai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing, MI, 1958), p. 117.

foreign help. Mao Tse-tung announced in 1949 that China “must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.”<sup>33</sup>In 1949, Mao did infact leaned on Soviet side in the cold war, despite its alliance between the CCP and the Soviet Union was quite unnatural, from 1921 to the 1950s.<sup>34</sup>

This was done in keeping its national interests strictly. At the outset, the need for security against the United States was the *raison d^etre* for the tilt, because the Americans were aiding the KMT in the civil war. Secondly the CCP was a new and unstable which needed a walking stick for its every step in the international arena. This could only be done by Soviet Union because of its affinity of ideological factor. China was against the United States effort to construct a cordon sanitaire around China’s periphery to contain the germs of revolution with the help of KMT. In the wake of the Korean War, it was also essential to Chinese defence against the Unites States and its task of national reconstruction.

During this period, say, after the triumph of Chinese Communism (1949) and the death of Stalin (1953), most of Soviet-Chinese national interests were identical and complementary ( common interests). Identical interests were both negative and positive in character. The negative character of identical interests were; against the re-emergence of a strong Japan - Stalin and Mao were convinced

---

<sup>33</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1961), vol. 4, p. 415.

<sup>34</sup> Chi Su, “The Strategic Triangle and China’s Soviet Policy,” in Robert S. Ross and Herbert J. Ellision, eds., *China, The United States and the Soviet Union: Tripolairty and Policy Making in the Cold War* (Armonk, New York, 1993), p. 42.

that as soon as Japan regained its strength, it would seek to reclaim the territories China and Soviet Union had stripped from it at the end of World War II<sup>35</sup>, against the American take-over of North Korea, defence against attack from the United States and against thermonuclear war with the United States. And the positive phase of the identical interests of Soviet Union and China were; striving for mutual increase in power and industrialisation, for expansion by peaceful and violent means of communist influence throughout the world, for end of the colonial era and conversion of newly independent countries to socialism and for Chinese representation on world councils, especially the United States.

The complementary interests of Soviet Union *vis-à-vis* China was that of against the United States influence in Europe. It had desired to control the regimes abroad, especially East European countries. And wanted to control over Chinese resources and over political direction of China. Protection from any possible attack from the rear (Sino-Soviet border) so as not to be engaged on too many fronts simultaneously.

The complementary interests of China *vis-à-vis* Soviet Union was that of against United States influence in Taiwan. Its desire to control land abroad, especially Taiwan and Vietnam and to get large amounts of Soviet industrial aid for rapid economic development to build support at home and as a basis for military modernisation.<sup>36</sup>

Albeit, having identical and complementary interests, there were conflicting

---

<sup>35</sup>Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York, 1997), p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 37.

interests too. Soviet Union wanted to wield direct control of China, especially Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Manchuria, but China sought freedom from such control, i.e., territorial and political integrity. Moreover, China was prohibited to allow foreign business activity in Xinjiang and Manchuria.<sup>37</sup> China wanted to reincorporate Mongolia as a Chinese province but the Soviet Union's refusal and continuance of "independence" of Mongolia was sought. Soviet Union's desire to keep the continuation of voice in the management of Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) was strongly objected by China, but rather, wanted to reimpose exclusive Chinese control over the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Each one was against the domination of North Korea. Moscow wanted to retain its colonial-era controls over Chinese territory; Beijing tried to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism.<sup>38</sup> The Chinese desire for the removal of Soviet base at Dairen with end of Korean War was against the interests of Soviet Far Eastern warm water port on Chinese territory<sup>39</sup>. Each nation's interest to establish regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy, and societal organisation were similar as possible was conflicting in nature.

#### **Soviet-Chinese National Interests in Khrushchevian Era**

During Khrushchev's tenure, identical interests and complementary interest took a back seat. The conflicting interests were soaring high in Soviet-Chinese agenda, although certain conflicting interests had been removed, especially the direct control Manchuria and Xinjiang was dropped in 1954. Soviet Union was

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 38

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

against the Chinese domination of Vietnam and China was against the Soviet Union domination of Vietnam. Out of fear of Russia, China had mixed feelings towards communist regimes in Asia that either lean towards the Soviet Union or seek to balance between Peking and Moscow. For example, that Hanoi was leaning towards Moscow, Peking had an interest in checking North Vietnamese expansion in the rest of Indochina (Particularly in Cambodia), in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. With regard to North Korea, Peking had already warned about “fence-sitters” who did not sufficiently condemn revisionism. Therefore, in order to check Soviet influence in Hanoi and in Pyongyang, Peking refrained from trying to undermine American influence in East and Southeast Asia.<sup>40</sup>

Khrushchev’s denigration of Stalin was criticised by Mao and his demand for the Stalin’s ideological authority be kept high was neglected. The peaceful co-existence of Khrushchev in the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of CPSU in 1956 which emphasised the expansion of communism through peaceful means, was against the interest of China. Moscow-Beijing conflict was evident in its combination of divergent positions on central questions: peaceful versus non-peaceful paths to socialism; peaceful co-existence versus the unavoidability of warlike conflict between socialism and capitalism/ imperialism. China wanted to keep the United States as enemy number one. China did not favour the peaceful means of transition to communism, but rather through violent means. Soviet Union was

---

<sup>40</sup> Donald Zagoria, “Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement: A Proposal for US Foreign Policy”, *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), vol. 8, no.1, October 1976, p. 129.

against even small war with United States in order to stop any nuclear escalation was viewed suspiciously (e.g., Vietnam). The localised wars would check the American presence and influence in East and South East Asia. The Chinese participation in the management of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956 aroused Soviet opposition and irreparably damaged the psychological accord in Soviet-Chinese relations, because it was against the interest of the Soviet Union. It was seen an action of mustering strength to shackle the clutches of Soviet Party domination.<sup>41</sup> China's challenge to the Soviet ideological primacy as a claim to be the legitimate centre of the world communist movement was a really severe conflicting interest for the Soviet Union. China wanted to impose Mao's ideology to be the legitimate centre of the world communist movement, especially in Asia.

Soviet policy on Taiwan also altered. Earlier Moscow was prepared to favour China in recovering Taiwan. In October 1959, after meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David, Khrushchev warned Mao against testing the capitalist countries with force. He advised China to use "peaceful measures" to unify Taiwan and to "consider possibly granting temporary independence to Taiwan."<sup>42</sup> Taiwan was the Chinese vital interest. The unwillingness to confront United States in supporting Chinese irredenta policy over Taiwan irritated Chinese, rather it wanted use of Soviet power to forward Chinese irredenta interests in Taiwan. Another conflicting interest was that Moscow was not willing to side with Beijing in the disputed Sino-Indian Himalayan border war in 1959. Contrarily, Soviet Union

---

<sup>41</sup> Su, n. 34, p. 43.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Steven M. Goldstein, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962: Ideology and Unity," in Harry Harding, ed., *Patterns of Co-operation in the Foreign Relations of Modern China*.

helped India in the Sino-Indian war. As differences widened in alarming pace, the identical interests of Soviet Union and China, which was high during the Stalin period had fallen sharply. Consequently, the conflicting national interest rose alarmingly.

### **National Interest in Brezhnev Era**

During Brezhnev era, the relation between Soviet Union and China was one of strong estrangement. The treaty of friendship, co-operation did not last long. The national interest of each country was more opposite to each other than the any period of given time. A significant trend was the progressive break-up of complementary interests and their precipitation into the list of conflicting interests. Soviet Union and China viewed each other a big threat to its existence and regarded as number one enemy and threat to their security<sup>43</sup>. As a result, security interest took precedence over other interests.

National security can easily be said the vital interest of a country. The traditional definitions of vital national interest is that it is that on which a state is unwilling to make any concessions and on which, if necessary, it is prepared to go to war. The national security of a nation is very basic that it is often regarded as permanent. National security has an emotional appeal to the people. National security one which is so vital for a nation that it is normally willing to go to war immediately or ultimately in order to safeguard the country. National security which is a vital interest on which all other hopes and aspirations of country revolve

---

<sup>43</sup> See Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977*, (Boulder, 1978).



round. It is axiomatic in international politics that nation-states have neither permanent enemies nor friends but only permanent interests. The permanent interest of any country in any given situation is security interest of a nation. The formula of national interest had become almost synonymous with the formula of national security because of the impact of cold war and threats of external aggression.

This proved when the fierce competition of China with Soviet Union, especially in the Third World, the Chinese ideological challenge to Soviet revisionism, the challenge of the world communist leadership made Soviet leaders think China a growing military threat to the survival of Soviet Union. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were the mechanisms adopted for its stringent anti-Soviets that culminated in border clashes in 1969.

The *détente* with West by Soviet Union was too a great concern to China and it looked Soviet union very suspiciously. The *détente* with the US really placed China in a tight corner as these two super power countries moved in closer to avoid the catastrophic nuclear war and to limit the arms expenditure. Both superpower wanted to give a lease of life for the-humanity as a whole. The Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China (1969) gave a call to fight untidily against both Western imperialism and social imperialism. The two-front war diverted Chinese efforts from modernisation to a massive defence build-up in its interior. China, finding itself on the brink of confrontation with both superpowers at once, was

obliged to calculate its national interest very carefully.<sup>44</sup> Chinese policy was marked by a desire to improve relations with all countries not aligned or friendly with the Soviet Union after the clashes on the border. Fortunately, many developments in the field of international politics facilitated the application of the new policy adopted by China after 1969.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the 1969 Soviet-Chinese border war and the ensuing Soviet threat to launch a preventive attack on Chinese nuclear installations in Gansu and a limited ground attack into industrial north-eastern China refocused China's attention on strategic considerations. This transformation led China to abandon the dual-adversary policy as it sought to improve United States-Chinese relations in order to offset the escalating Soviet threat. The fact that China joined the imperialist camp and initiated the "strategic triangle" portrayed China's genuine fear of a possible attack of Soviet Union. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union tremendously increased the numbers of Soviet troops and deployed its most sophisticated nuclear and conventional weaponry along the Sino-Soviet border. By the end of the decade, China faced forty-five Soviet divisions in 1973, 150 Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the Soviet Backfire bomber.<sup>45</sup> At a minimum, Moscow was intent on coercing China to accommodate itself to Soviet interests. But China was unwilling

---

<sup>44</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "China and Russia: New Beginnings", in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, 1994), p. 95.

<sup>45</sup> See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Build up and Soviet Risk Taking Against China* (Santa Monica, CA, 1982); see also Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., *The Soviet Far East Military Build up: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security* (Dover, Mass, 1986).

to succumb to Soviet line of interest. China scaled down its support for the Vietnam war to accommodate United States. The point is that the Chinese leadership responded to its security dilemma vis-à-vis Soviet Union by allowing considerations of national interests to override ideological considerations almost entirely. Following this 'deradicalisation', China could chart its course according to a more conventional national interest calculus, compromising with capitalist countries, for example, in order to gain entree into the international market system. The opening to the West projected Chinese foreign policy into a period of global engagement. China moved into the mainstream of world affairs-establishing normal diplomatic relations with over a hundred countries, replacing Taiwan in the United Nations.

Witnessing the new alliance of China with the United States and the continued efforts to have a good relations with Japan, Soviet Union saw the Chinese' threat to its security interest of the nation. To diffuse these situations, Soviet border deployments were complemented by other military and diplomatic efforts to "encircle China"<sup>46</sup>. The Soviet Union expanded its spheres of influence through economic and military aid to other third world nations to shield its national interest. The United States and the West and China saw the growing influence of Soviet Union in most of the countries brought geo-political importance in the arena of international politics.

To the South China, Moscow formed a close relationship with Vietnam, using economic and military aid to lure Hanoi to its side in the Sino-Soviet

---

<sup>46</sup> Nathan and Ross, n. 35, p. 45.

conflict. This strategy not only paid off successfully, but also the Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1978, extending Soviet's influence throughout Indochina. Soviet access to bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang enhanced Moscow's ability to project naval and air power into the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The Soviet's strong presence in the sea of Okhotsk, sea of Japan, and the strait of Malacca was a strong security threat to Chinese national interests.

In South Asia, Moscow signed a treaty of peace , friendship, and co-operation with India in 1971. Later that same year the Indian army assisted the breakaway rebellion of Pakistan's eastern provinces, which established the new nation of Bangladesh and weakened one of China's few allies and its lone foothold in South Asia. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to prevent the collapse of Moscow's client regime there. Although Afghanistan's eastern extremity abuts China's Xinjiang province, Afghanistan's real strategic significance to China derived from its lengthy borders with Pakistan and Iran, two states China valued as bulwarks against Soviet expansion. China believed that Moscow's move into Afghanistan was part of the historical Russian push toward the south, foreshadowing increased pressure on Islamabad and Teheran to acquiesce in the expansion of Soviet influence.

To Moscow's encirclement of China, it counter-posed a policy of counter-encirclement. China sought good relations with Soviet neighbours stretching from Japan through Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, to Eastern and Western Europe<sup>47</sup>. In 1972, China normalised its relations with Japan and in 1978, it signed a peace

---

<sup>47</sup> Zagoria, n. 40, pp. 123-35.

treaty. China tacitly backed the United States-Japan security alliance while supported Japan's claim of Kurile Islands (territorial dispute with Moscow). China feared that Soviet dominance in the Middle East would facilitate its victory over the West.. Should Iran align with the USSR, it could provide the Soviet navy easy access to the Persian Gulf, jeopardising the West's access to Middle East oil. China also sought to strengthen its ties with many of the most conservative regimes in West Asia such as Iran and Saudi Arabia that the US had also long supported. Indeed, China liked nothing better than to receive CENTO.<sup>48</sup> China developed close relation with the shah of Iran. Chinese policy toward Africa and Latin America also followed the logic of its anti-Soviet posture.

The national security issue was gradually brought under control without unduly alarming such third parties as the United States, by the advent of Deng Xiaoping. Deng's political and economic reform programmes promoted improved Sino-Soviet relations because the justification for sustaining the ideological conflict disappeared when China became more 'revisionist' than the Soviet Union. In May 1982, not long before he died, Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed Moscow's desire to improve relations with Beijing. He hoped to weaken China's position with the United States just as the Reagan administration increased its military pressure on the Soviet Union and challenged PRC Interests in Taiwan. China also took initiative to settle the outstanding issues between the two countries and improve bilateral relations.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Tong Yixin, "China and the Soviet Union Start Negotiations on Mutual Relations", *Zhongguo baike nianjian* (Chinese encyclopaedia yearbook, 1980), (Beijing, 1980), p. 268.

## **National Interest in Gorbachev Era**

The PRC's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union during the Andropov and Chernenko interregnums between 1982 and 1985 was low-key, methodical, and totally consistent with the trend set in 1979. Gorbachev's succession to power gave a new impetus to that process of eradicating those interests which are detrimental to their relations through his 'new thinking'. China demanded that the Soviet Union overcome what they called "three obstacles". China considered these three obstacles were highly detrimental to its national interests and asked for the removal of the same. The demanding situation for the USSR was that it was involved in the fierce competition of arms race with the West, which ate the major portion of the economy of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet economy looked thin and feeble. The prime interest of the nation was to make the economy stable and viable. In order to make the economy stable, the country needed to have good relations with China and to liquidate his predecessors' bad overseas investments in the form of military aid and economic aid for the satellite countries.

What made normalisation of relations between the two communist powers theoretically possible was that the virulence of their bilateral conflicting interest was slowly and steadily dissipating. Many of the original issues over which they had fought so bitterly in the past-such as which nation followed true Leninist- and which had left a legacy of mistrust, appear in retrospect much less significant and even trivial. And although the accumulated hostility still affected attitudes and judgements of both leaderships, they knew that they should deal with the new realities keeping in mind the national interests. The facts that they were aware that

maintaining the conflict at a high-pitched level strains both countries' resources, played havoc with their national interests.<sup>50</sup> This realisation marked an era of low conflict and promised for a high co-operation keeping in mind their national interest. The 'real politik' was the major player in the international environment, where ideology had found no place. It was economic interest of these two nations which had taken precedence.

Eventually, Gorbachev took the initiative to resolve "three obstacles" as part of the "new Thinking" he introduced into Soviet foreign policy. In July 1986 he promised to reduce troop levels in Soviet Asia. In February 1988, Soviet Defence Minister Dimitrii Yazov announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw a large number of troops from the Sino-Soviet border areas.<sup>51</sup> By May 1989, Gorbachev removed all the obstacles which hindered for the normalisation of relations.<sup>52</sup> Gorbachev's Soviet Union in 1985-89 and Deng Xiaoping's China in 1979-89 were driven toward normalisation by the same domestic imperative. Thus the three great conflicting interests got demised, however the newer one got emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Between 1989 and 1991, the world witnessed a series of momentous changes that completely transformed the cold war power structure. The collapse Communist Party of Soviet Union, de-sovietisation of Eastern Europe saw the imminent threat to socialism in China. China now faced a threat from what might

---

<sup>50</sup> Vladimir Petrov, "China goes it Alone", *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), vol. 23, no. 5, May 1983, p. 582.

<sup>51</sup> Nathan and Ross, n. 35, p. 48.

<sup>52</sup> Dittmer, n. 44, p. 97.

be called “democratic containment”.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, both China and Russia (after the disintegration of Soviet Union) now have common interest in preventing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Moscow and Beijing are co-operating each other to contain fundamentalist influence than to manipulate fundamentalism to destabilise each other.

### **Nuclear Weapons and National Interest**

Morgenthau’s analysis of national interests, he informed that the nature of alliances changes in the nuclear age and that alliances between a bipolar core member and a peripheral member of its system may carry risks unacceptable to the latter, despite an otherwise large range of common interests.<sup>54</sup> Under the nuclear era, alliances are less useful instruments for pursuit of the national interest and nations tend to be ever more mutually isolated. Nuclear weapons certainly have deterrent capacity. Even a small nation can challenge a big power if it is a nuclear power. This is where the importance of being a nuclear power is felt by China. Nuclear weapons were obviously a discordant issue between the Soviet Union and China.

Morgenthau had set out in concise terms what the relations among allies must be when only one possesses nuclear weapons but when each is faced with the a nuclearly-armed opponent.<sup>55</sup> The possession of nuclear weapons by one or both

---

<sup>53</sup> Su, n. 34, p. 58.

<sup>54</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, “Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” *American Political Science Review* (Washington), vol. 58, no. 1, March 1964, p. 33-35.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*



of the alliance partners radically transforms the alliance relationship. The Soviet Union, possessing nuclear weapons, wished above all to keep out of nuclear conflict with the United States. But it was allied to China, it had its own ambitions and interests different from the Soviet Union's. This is what happened when Khrushchev declared his peaceful co-existence with the West in his 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of the Soviet Union. But China wanted to revolutionary means of achieving socialism not through peaceful means. The crux of the problem is that in the nuclear age alliances are highly unreliable devices with which to assure one's security. Neither the Soviet Union nor China could be assured that the other would come to its aid, for neither would accept nuclear destruction for the sake of the other. China was not sure that the Soviet Union would risk her entire existence for the sake of Chinese goals. So, China wanted to stand by its own legs for its security and other national interests. Dependency on Soviet Union for its security and national interests was too high. In course of time China had to forgo certain national prestige when dealing with either Soviet Union or United States. Whenever it wanted to deal with United States, China had to keep in mind the national interest of Soviet Union too, because it was dependent on Soviet Union.

China thought that the possession of nuclear weapon would empower China to resist American nuclear blackmail. Moreover, it would reduce the need for direct Soviet involvement in any future Sino-American crises.

But soon after the stiffness in the relationship between the two communist nations, Soviet Union deserted the New Defence Technical Accord. In early 1958 Moscow began to drag its heels on fulfilling its obligations under the 1957 nuclear-

sharing agreement and finally in June 1959 it formally cancelled the agreement.. As per the accord during 1957, Moscow and Beijing signed the New Defence Technical Accord, USSR proposed to assist China in developing nuclear weaponry by providing Beijing a sample bomb and missiles as well as technical information.<sup>56</sup> Moscow thought that transference of the nuclear technology would impede its negotiations with the United States on a limited test-ban treaty. And it said, if the West found out about Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear programme, Soviet efforts to relax relations with the West might be compromised. Moscow also foresaw that if China acquired the nuclear technology, its reduced dependence on Moscow would enable Beijing to assert Chinese nationalistic and ideological concerns. The monolithic Party position in the international communist movement would be wiped out. And there were already a sign of challenge in the international communist movement. When Khrushchev visited Beijing, Mao accused him of encroaching on Chinese sovereignty and seeking to “take away all our coastal areas.” He warned the Soviet leader, “The British, Japanese, and other foreigners who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us, Comrade Khrushchev. I’ll repeat it again. We don not want anyone to use our land to achieve their own purpose anymore.”<sup>57</sup> This irked him and learned that the repressed differences gradually emerged.

The Chinese nuclear explosion late in 1964 saw them from the pit of

---

<sup>56</sup> The negotiations over nuclear co-operation are discussed in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, 1988), pp. 60-65.

<sup>57</sup> William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” (Paper prepared for the Cold War International History Project Hong Kong Conference on the Cold War in Asia, January 9-12, 1996), pp. 8-9.

complete dependence to a point of competition. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of both superpowers was seen by China a grand design against its improvisation of nuclear capabilities.<sup>58</sup>

However, An important aspect of the understanding of international reality was born. The birth of international reality was related to the problem of survival. This became serious especially under the impact of nuclear weapons and the resultant change in the nature of war. Under this nuclear age, every nation was (is) concerned not with the security of an individual nation but with the security or survival of all nations. In the past, nations could hope to achieve policy objectives even through temporary superiority in armed forces or through alignment with more powerful nations.<sup>59</sup> But the fear of total destruction made (makes) the attainment of the fruit of superiority almost impossible. The whole concept of victory had (has) become meaningless because it involved (involved) the risk of total destruction of the enemy's territory and possessions as also one's own similar destruction. In consequence, all nations -large, small, communist, non-communist- for the first time had (have) an overriding common interest in the avoidance of war.<sup>60</sup>In other words, nuclear war involved (involves) the 'danger of mutual suicide'. Writer like Harold Lasswell and Jacob Viner and many others had drawn attention to the fact that the use of nuclear weapons for defence would actually leave nothing to defend.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> G. S. Mishra, 'Normalisation of Sino-Soviet Relations', in Indian Centre for Regional Affairs, *New Contours of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1989), p.70.

<sup>59</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago, 1958), p. 178.

<sup>60</sup> Morgenthau, n. 29, p. 283.

<sup>61</sup> Harlod D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948), p. 180.

At the same time, nuclear weapons have not modified the range of traditional interests pursued by powers, nor have they changed the problems associated therewith. They have, however, modified the means for pursuing those interests: for the most part these must now be peaceful (and therefore) diplomatic in character.<sup>62</sup> The nuclear weapons has given the thrust for the process of diplomatic settlements. As Gorbachev described it, the heart of the new thinking was the priority of common human values in the nuclear age.<sup>63</sup> The real national interests in the nuclear age required the creation of an international climate favourable to a deep socio-political and economic transformation.

---

<sup>62</sup> Morgenthau, n. 29, p. 138.

<sup>63</sup> Bruce Parrot, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev", *Problems of Communism*, vol. 37, November-December, 1988, p.27.